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Introduction
Edmund Burke is famous for his empiricist and physiological account of aesthetic 
pleasure in the beautiful and delight in the sublime. Burke argues that aesthetic 
pleasure or taste cannot be explained without taking into account our most funda-
mental human interests: the feeling of the beautiful is grounded in our social nature 
and, more specifically, in our passions that are concerned with ‘the society of the 
sexes’,1 and our delight in the sublime is rooted in our desire for self-preservation.
His empiricist and physiological theory of aesthetic pleasure was heavily con-
tested by his contemporaries and was only revived through the later Nietzsche’s 
‘physiology of aesthetics’ and his fierce attack on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s 
account of aesthetic disinterestedness. Kant’s account of aesthetic disinterestedness 
can be understood (I shall argue) as a critical response to Burke’s empiricist account,2 
but – pace Nietzsche’s harsh mockery of Kant’s view – aesthetic disinterestedness, 
as Kant analyses it, does not imply any rejection of the relevance of the senses and 
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[AU1]
1 References to Burke’s Enquiry are to E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and 
Beautiful, edited with an introduction and notes by James T. Boulton (London: Routledge, 2008), 
abbreviated PE. As with the rest of the references in this book, Roman numbers refer to the part 
and section, followed by the page number in Arabic. Here, PE, I.ix.41–42.
2 I do not claim that Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of Judgment is a response only to 
Burke’s views on the beautiful and the sublime. It is not only impossible to discuss the historical 
context of Kant’s third Critique in a single essay, but it would also be absurd to reduce Kant’s treat-
ment of aesthetics to a response to only one author. Kant not only criticises Edmund Burke, but 
also Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Lord Kames, Alexander Gerard, Alexander Baumgarten 
and several others.
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the body in aesthetic judging. On the contrary, Kant’s transcendental critique of 
aesthetic judgement is – at least to a certain extent – reconcilable with Burke’s 
somatic theory, but repudiates the latter’s empiricist identification of the agreeable 
and the beautiful. Furthermore, like Burke, Kant emphasises the social nature of the 
aesthetic experience, but argues (rightly) that Burke cannot justify the universal 
validity claim inherent in judgements of taste.
I devote the first part of this paper to a discussion of Burke’s and Kant’s views of 
aesthetic pleasure, especially in the beautiful, in order to show that Kant’s view of the 
disinterestedness of aesthetic pleasure or liking (Wohlgefallen) can be interpreted as 
a critical response to Burke’s failure to distinguish properly between the beautiful 
and the agreeable. The second part of my paper is concerned with the social value of 
aesthetic judgement and experience. Although Kant – perhaps wrongly3 – holds that 
the universal communicability of aesthetic judgements logically follows from the 
disinterested character of the pleasure on which they are based, Kant’s emphasis on 
the a priori validity of judgements of beauty can be viewed, or so I argue, as a rebut-
tal of the kind of empiricist and physio-psychological arguments that Burke offers to 
justify the social nature of the experience of beauty.
Burke and Kant on Pleasure and Disinterestedness
On a Burkean view, aesthetic pleasure can occur in at least two distinct ways. 
Something can be positively pleasurable and negatively pleasurable. Pleasure and 
pain are, Burke contends, no mere relations, which could only exist in contrast to 
some previous state of mind: there are pleasures and pains ‘of a positive and inde-
pendent nature’ (PE, I.iv.35) and the diminution or cessation of pain does not result 
in positive pleasure, but in, what Burke calls, delight. Delight is related to privation, 
i.e., it is a pleasure ‘which cannot exist without a relation … to pain’ (PE, I.iv.36). 
The beautiful is the aesthetic variant of positive pleasure, whereas our feeling of the 
sublime is based on relative pleasure, i.e. so-called delight. Our delight in the sublime – 
‘the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling’ (PE, I.vii.39) – belongs 
3 At least according to some commentators. See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 117: ‘From the fact that a delight is not caused 
by any interest or desire, it does not follow that it is valid for everyone. It might be entirely acci-
dental, or based on some other kind of merely private condition. Universality cannot be deduced 
from disinterestedness alone, nor does it follow that in requiring disinterestedness of a pleasure 
one is requiring that it be universal; one may simply be requiring a source other than interest, 
quite apart from any consideration of intersubjective validity at all. Indeed, one might maintain 
that unless the requirement of disinterestedness is already a normative requirement for intersub-
jective acceptability, trying to deduce such a requirement from disinterestedness confuses a 
factual matter with a normative requirement.’ For discussion, see Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory 
of Taste. A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 99–103.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
to the passions of self-preservation. The sublime delight can arise only when there 
is danger and terror is felt: ‘A mode of terror, or of pain, is always the cause of the 
sublime’ (PE, IV.viii.134). The emotion of terror is closely related to privation of 
some sort: solitude as the privation of society, silence as the privation of sound, 
darkness as the privation of light. The feeling of the sublime occurs when this 
privation is suspended: the fear or terror is postponed. We are threatened by loss: 
language, light, sound, life, everything threatens to disappear, and then, this terror 
of nothingness, this feeling of losing everything is suspended, and we experience 
delight. We experience the delight of being deprived of those privations. No moral 
catharsis occurs, as Aristotle thought. The delight in the sublime offers no moral 
purification or elevation, but intensifies our affective capacities, and heightens 
our sensitivity.
Whereas the sublime is bound up with our sense for self-preservation and our 
fear of losing our capacities to live our own lives, the beautiful is a positive pleasure 
that is grounded in our social capacities and our desire to live with others. Not sur-
prisingly, Burke connects the beautiful with love, which is ‘that satisfaction which 
arises to the mind upon contemplating anything beautiful’ and which needs to be 
distinguished from desire or lust, ‘which is an energy of the mind, that hurries us on 
to the possession of certain objects, that do not affect us as they are beautiful, but by 
means altogether different.’ (PE, III.i.91) Beauty is a social quality, ‘for where 
women and men, and not only they, but when animals give us a sense of joy and 
pleasure is beholding them, (and there are many that do so) they inspire us with 
sentiments of tenderness and affection towards their persons; we like to have them 
near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we should 
have strong reasons to the contrary.’ (PE, I.x.42–43)
Kant not only reacts against the rationalists who wrongly ‘intellectualize’ 
aesthetic experience by assimilating the beautiful to the good, but also attacks the 
advocates of an empirical and physiological approach, and especially Burke, since 
Kant says that he ‘deserves to be named as the foremost author in this sort of 
approach’ (CJ, 5: 77).4 The first, most obvious, reason for this repudiation of Burke’s 
‘physiological exposition’ (ibid.) is that it cannot properly distinguish between the 
feelings of the agreeable and the beautiful. On the physiological view, the difference 
is merely a difference in degree and not in quality. The second is that this approach 
cannot account for, what Kant calls, the ‘pluralistic’ nature of aesthetic judgements 
(CJ, 5: 278), i.e. the idea – which Kant shares with rationalist predecessors such as 
Mendelssohn and Baumgarten – that in matters of aesthetic taste, there is a genuine 
‘reason to have controversy about taste, not merely to shrug one’s shoulders and say 
4 The abbreviation CJ refers to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Citations to the Critique of Judgment 
are to volume 5 and the section and page numbers of the Akademie-Ausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1902–). The English translations are based on I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated, with an 
introduction, by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). I have modified this translation 
where it seemed appropriate.
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“to each his own”: because judgments of taste rest upon some sort of judgment of 
the object, specifically of the object’s form’.5 Thus, contra Hume, Burke and other 
empiricists, Kant argues that aesthetic judgements justifiably make claims to uni-
versal validity. We value beauty not just because of our own private or ‘egoistic’ 
(CJ, 5: 278) interests – and nor, as Burke holds, because beauty stimulates our social 
passions, such as love – but as a priori shareable with others who possess the same 
discriminatory and judgemental capacities. I shall return to this second issue in the 
second part of my paper, and now concentrate on the first one: the distinction 
between the agreeable and the beautiful, and why Kant believes that disinterested-
ness is a suitable criterion to distinguish qualitatively between both feelings.
Kant agrees with Burke that, ‘as Epicurus maintained, gratification and pain are 
always ultimately corporeal … because life without the feeling of the corporeal organ is 
merely consciousness of one’s own existence, but not a feeling of well- or ill-being’. 
He even praises Burke’s analyses of (aesthetic) pleasure and displeasure as ‘extremely 
fine’ and admits that his ‘psychological remarks … provide rich materials for the 
favorite researches of empirical anthropology’ (CJ, 5: 277), but rejects his empiricist 
assimilation of pleasure in the beautiful to merely agreeable sensation.
How does Kant distinguish the feeling of the beautiful from the agreeable? 
Pleasure in the agreeable is, Kant argues, ‘interested’. There is much debate in the 
literature about the exact meaning of this phrase. As Nick Zangwill rightly remarks, 
‘many commentators have found Kant’s account problematic if not completely 
unintelligible.’6 Whereas I do not pretend to be able to completely clarify this complex 
notion here, we do need to linger on it for a while and try to make the most of it, 
since the question of interest and disinterest is crucial to a better understanding of 
Kant’s qualms about Burke’s physiological approach, which (according to Kant) 
unjustifiably identifies the pleasure in the beautiful with the pleasure in the agree-
able. Kant argues that pleasure in the beautiful is disinterested, unlike our pleasure 
in the agreeable. In Sect. 2 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant writes that ‘the satis-
faction that we combine with the representation of the existence of an object is 
called interest. Hence such a satisfaction always has at the same time a relation to 
the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or else as necessarily intercon-
nected with its determining ground.’ (CJ, 5: 204) In his insightful essay on ‘Kant 
on Pleasure in the Agreeable’, Zangwill clarifies this as follows: ‘if a pleasure is 
an “interest”, in Kant’s sense, it means that it bears an intimate relation to a desire 
(that is, a concern with real existence). An “interest” is a pleasure that has some kind 
of necessary connection with desire. A pleasure is “disinterested” if it has no such 
necessary connection with desire’.7 It is worth noting that Kant’s conception of 
5 Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology. An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 176.
6 Nick Zangwill, “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
53, no. 2 (1995): 167.
7 Zangwill, “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable,” 167.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
interest is broader than the idea of self-interest that Kant’s reference to the capacity 
of desire (Begehrungsvermögen) seems to suggest; thus, pleasures in the good – 
moral pleasures – are as ‘interested’ as pleasures in the agreeable. By contrast, Kant 
claims that our pleasure in the beautiful cannot originate from any interest, but also, 
and more importantly, insists that our pleasure in the beautiful does not create any 
interest in the object either.
What can this mean? As Kant asserts at the beginning of Sect. 5, ‘a judgment of 
taste is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent with regard to 
the existence of the object: it considers the character of the object only by holding it 
up to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (nur seine Beschaffenheit mit dem 
Gefühl der Lust und Unlust zusammenhält).’ (CJ, §5, 5: 209) This specific require-
ment that a judgement of beauty be devoid of all interest not merely grounds Kant’s 
distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful but also between aesthetic and 
moral pleasure.8 Since we are here really concerned with Kant’s criticism of Burke’s 
empiricist theory of taste, we shall not go into the latter distinction.
How does Kant distinguish exactly between beauty and agreeableness? Agreeable 
objects, say Belgian chocolates, which cause pleasure merely because of their sen-
suous nature or their sensible properties, are said to ‘gratify (vergnügen)’ someone. 
More specifically, when I enjoy eating a Belgian chocolate, ‘I am not granting mere 
approval: the agreeable produces an inclination’ and ‘arouses a desire for objects of 
the same kind’ (CJ, §3, 5: 207). Thus, Kant holds that ‘all interest presupposes a 
need or gives rise to one; and, because interest is the basis that determines approval, 
it makes the judgment about the object unfree’ (CJ, §5, 5: 210).9 Thus, the basic 
difference between the agreeable and the beautiful must be that the agreeable, unlike 
the beautiful, gives rise to a desire for similar objects. Kant thus plausibly argues 
that pleasure in the agreeable is connected with the existence of the object that 
caused the agreeable sensation in th  first place, whereas pleasure in the beautiful is 
not. If the satisfaction caused by the object leads to a desire for more similar objects, 
e.g. similar Belgian chocolates, then this implies that the initial satisfaction was 
connected with the existence of the first object.10 How else could it produce this 
desire (or inclination) for more objects that are thought to be similar?
8 See Anne-Marie Roviello, “Du beau comme symbole du bien,” in ed. Herman Parret, Kants 
Ästhetik, Kant’s Aesthetics, L’esthétique de Kant (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 374–85. See 
also Birgit Recki, “Das Schöne als Symbol der Freiheit” in the same volume, pp. 386–402.
9 In ‘Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable’, Nick Zangwill rightly emphasises that this unfreedom of 
the pleasure in the agreeable is ‘a matter of the causes of the pleasure. It does not detract from what 
Kant is saying about the way that pleasure then provokes desire, via a representation. If a pleasure 
is unfree, it is unfree because of the way it is caused, not because of what it causes.’ (170)
10 This does not necessarily imply that Kant is offering a purely causal account of the interestedness 
of pleasure in the agreeable. I here agree with Zangwill, ‘Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable’, 169: 
‘Once we see that Kant is not offering a purely causal account of the interestedness of pleasure in 
the agreeable, we will be less prone to think that he thinks that pleasure in the beautiful is disinter-
ested because the pleasure bears no causal relation to the objects that we find pleasurable and thus 
call beautiful. If Kant did think this, it would make his claim that pleasure in the beautiful is disin-
terested very implausible. But fortunately Kant holds no such view.’
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Paul Guyer suggests that ‘Kant is not making a phenomenological distinction 
between different kinds of feelings of pleasure, but a distinction between the ways 
in which different instances of pleasure may be occasioned’.11 Thus, Kant maintains 
‘that the presence or absence of a connection to interest may serve as a criterion for 
the reflective classification of given pleasures’.12 Section 3 of the CJ aims to show 
that ‘the satisfaction in the agreeable is combined with interest’ (CJ, §3, 5: 205). By 
contrast, our pleasure in the beautiful cannot be based on an interest or inclination, 
or else the beautiful would be identical with the agreeable,13 which is exactly the 
Burkean view that Kant wants to dismiss: ‘the agreeable is that which pleases the 
senses in sensation’, whereas the beautiful is based on what I make of a representa-
tion ‘in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object.’ (ibid.) In this 
context, Kant makes a crucial (but often overlooked) distinction between two distinct 
meanings of the term ‘sensation’ (Empfindung).14 In the Critique of Pure Reason 
this term denotes ‘an objective representation of the senses’, or a representation 
available for empirical knowledge of objects. The sensation of the colour green in a 
green meadow, for instance, is an objective sensation, because it can become a 
component in empirical concepts, such as that of grass. When the term is used in 
connection with aesthetic pleasure and displeasure, though, ‘it is related solely to 
the subject and does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the 
subject cognizes itself.’ (CJ, §3, 5: 206) This kind of ‘subjective sensation’ must 
always remain purely subjective, and Kant refers to it using the term ‘feeling’ 
(Gefühl) (CJ, 5: 189; §3, 5: 206).
This distinction does not, however, establish a sound basis for discriminating 
between the beautiful and the agreeable. First, how plausible is Kant’s claim that 
pleasures in the agreeable are necessarily productive of desire for more similar 
objects? Not all pleasures in the agreeable provoke the desire for more of the same 
kind of objects that occasioned the pleasure in the first place. Put more concretely, 
as Zangwill asks, ‘what about the last piece of chocolate that we enjoy before we 
have had enough? … The sight of yet more chocolate can soon come to disgust one. 
It seems that the last pleasurable piece of chocolate does not provoke a desire for 
more of the same’.15 Thus, although Kant may be right that many kinds of agreeable 
sensations are ‘more-ish’ or productively interested, not all pleasures in the agree-
able are. There is a second possible objection to Kant’s distinction, viz. that Kant, 
as Guyer notes, instead of distinguishing between kinds of pleasure, merely sup-
plies ‘a distinction between feelings of pleasure and all other kinds of sensation’.16 
11 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, p. 152.
12 Ibid.
13 J.-F. Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 161.
14 See J.-F. Lyotard, The Differend. Phrases in Dispute, trans. G. Van Den Abbeele (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988), 132.
15 Zangwill, ‘Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable’, 172.
16 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 153.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
At first glance, Guyer seems right, but Kant’s view of pleasure is more complicated 
than Guyer17 allows. By defining pleasure as feeling instead of sensation, Kant is not 
merely saying that pleasure is some peculiar kind of sensation, i.e., a subjective 
sensation ‘which cannot become an element of cognition at all’ (CJ, 5: 189), since 
it does not refer to objects. The subjective nature of Kant’s notion of feeling is much 
more profound than Guyer recognises. Rachel Zuckert18 suggests (rightly) that 
‘pleasure is, on Kant’s definition, a representation with intentional content, which 
comprises other representations understood to be modifications of the subject (that 
is, are themselves not [solely] referred to objects).’19 Kant characterises pleasure in 
the Critique of Judgment as the ‘consciousness of the causality of a representation 
with respect to the state of the subject, for maintaining it in that state’ (CJ, §10, 5: 
220; bold in the original), and in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 
he claims that ‘what directly (through sense) urges me to leave my state (to go out 
of it) is disagreeable to me – it causes me pain; just as what drives me to maintain 
my state (to remain in it) is agreeable to me, I enjoy it’ (Anth., 7: 231; italics in the 
original).20
Thus, Kant does not agree with Burke (and other empiricists) that pleasure is a 
kind of primitive or raw sensation, but holds that pleasure is a representation with 
intentional content, i.e., a mental state that is about another mental state, a feeling 
about something, or put more accurately, about the continuation in time of the feeling 
or the mental state.21 Pleasure in eating Belgian chocolates would then be the aware-
ness or ‘the feeling that the representation of chocolate is “causing” one to stay in 
the state of having that representation (of the taste of chocolate).’22 Pleasure is thus 
intimately connected with the feeling of life (Lebensgefühl) (CJ, 5: 204; 277), i.e., 
with enjoying the state one finds oneself in when (for instance) experiencing the sen-
sible properties of an object. Thus, on a Kantian view, pleasure is no mere ‘raw 
feel’, as Guyer, along with numerous other commentators, claims. It does not need 
to be referred to objects via empirical concepts or judgements, but is necessarily 
characterised by intentionality, i.e., ‘aboutness’: it ‘is about’ a subject’s mental state. 
Therefore, it is aptly called subjective by Kant, although it is not a sensation, but ‘a 
second-order, reflexive state with respect both to other mental states and to the posi-
tion of those states in time, the form of inner sense.’23 We do not experience pleasure 
17 P. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
280–1, and Kant and the Claims of Taste, 104–5.
18 Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, 233. I here follow Zuckert’s excellent account (233ff.) of 
the intentional nature of pleasure, but I do not agree with her identification of the intentionality of 
pleasure with purposiveness without a purpose.
19 Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, 233.
20 I here refer to I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary Gregor (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
21 Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, 233.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 236.
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primarily as the separate effect of something, but we take pleasure in something 
(ibid.), e.g., in drinking a glass of Chablis, in eating spinach, in sinking into a hot 
bath, etc.
Contra Burke, Kant argues that – although bodily pleasures such as a sexual 
orgasm or tasting a fine wine may seem to suggest otherwise – pleasures are not free 
floating sensations but reflexive, second-order feelings. Contrary also to his earlier 
view defended in the Critique of Practical Reason, in the Critique of Judgment he 
now claims that not all pleasures are sensations or, more accurately, sensory plea-
sures are, pace Burke, not the only kind of pleasure – although he does retain the 
view that when pleasures are ‘sensations’ (pleasures in the agreeable or ‘enjoy-
ments’), they are ‘the same in kind, differing only in degree’.24 Of course, he agrees 
with Burke that sensory pleasure is a kind of pleasure, but repudiates Burke’s privi-
leging of sensory (or bodily) pleasure – the sensuous pleasure we take in enjoying a 
cognac or a hot shower – as a model for all other kinds of pleasure. Hence, Kant 
claims that pleasure in the agreeable is only a sub-class of pleasure; this is the kind 
of sensory pleasures that we share with animals (CJ, 5: 210). There is no reason to 
privilege agreeable sensations over other kinds of pleasure, such as intellectual or 
moral pleasures.
As previously noted, Kant rashly claims that all pleasures in the agreeable are 
productively interested, i.e. arouse the desire for more objects of the same kind. 
‘Sated’ pleasures, such as orgasms, do not – at least not immediately – provoke the 
desire for more orgasms.25 Yet what about Kant’s insistence that pleasure in the 
beautiful is devoid of interest, i.e., is only related to the subject’s feeling of life 
(Lebensgefühl), and is completely independent of the existence of the object? Kant 
argues that pure aesthetic pleasure is directed to the representation of the object, as 
opposed to the connection between the subject and the existence of the object.
For aesthetic judgement, a repr sentation of the object is all that is required, 
whereas in an ‘interested’ response to an object, its actual existence will be involved. 
In a rather amusing note, taken from his Reflexionen from the mid-1770s, Kant 
furnishes examples of the sorts of interest in existence that must be excluded from 
the pure aesthetic appreciation:
Taste shows itself if one does not choose merely on account of usefulness. Therefore, a 
porcelain button is more beautiful than a silver one. The beauty of lace consists in the fact 
that it does not last long. Clothes are therefore chosen of delicate colors, because they are 
perishable. Flowers have their beauty in their perishability. (Nature has given the least 
beauty to that which is enjoyable because it nourishes: cows, bees, swine, sheep; to that 
which refreshes in enjoyment, somewhat more: fruit; that which smells nice, more: and that 
which can merely please the eye, the most.26
According to Guyer, ‘this passage misinterprets the requirements of disinterest-
edness’, as it not merely separates taste from practical dependence, but in fact 
[AU2]
24 Ibid., 240.
25 Zangwill, ‘Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable’, 174.
26 Immanuel Kant, Reflexion 868, Ak. XV, 1, 382.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
‘proposes an actual conflict between beauty and practicality’.27 Technically speaking, 
Guyer is right. Disinterested contemplation does not necessarily imply an asym-
metry of beauty and practicality: a kind of syncretism of both remains possible. 
Thus, Kant only points out that there is quite often a real conflict between taste and 
usefulness, or beauty and practicality, which can serve as a corroborating fact about 
the disinterestedness of the pure judgement of taste. The inverse relationship 
between beauty and usefulness is not a necessary consequence of the judgement’s 
disinterestedness, although this logical fact does not subsequently rule out the pos-
sibility of an actual conflict between both.
Kant’s basic idea is that of the contrast between the mere representation of an 
object and the full nexus of its causal relations. Only in the case of the latter can we 
have empirical knowledge of its causal basis. A physiological response can be the 
subject of empirical investigation and empirical causal laws. The agreeableness of 
the object may be included in the causal nexus that constitutes the real existence of 
the object, whereas the feeling of the beautiful cannot – again pace Burke, who 
claims that ‘the appearance of beauty as effectually causes some degree of love in us, 
as the application of ice or fire produces the ideas of heat or cold’ (PE, III.ii.92).
From a Burkean perspective, the beautiful causes the passion of love. Although 
Burke distinguishes love from desire, and (only) in this sense anticipates Kant’s 
analysis of the judgement of beauty as disinterested, he offers no solid basis to 
explain the qualitative distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable. As an 
empiricist, he can only account for a difference in degree. Kant holds not only that 
Burke’s distinction between desire and love is flawed, but also that his physiological 
explanation of the beautiful (and the sublime) cannot account for the ‘pluralistic’ 
nature of judgements of beauty. It is to this issue that we now turn.
The ‘Pluralistic’ Nature of Beauty
Although Burke emphasises the social nature of beauty and love, he remains silent 
on the question of the universality claim of judgements of beauty. He merely con-
nects it with our ‘passions for society’, but this has more to do with the passion 
caused by the experience of beauty, viz. love, than with the appreciation of beauty 
as such.
Kant severely condemns any attempt to dispense with the objectivity claim of 
pure aesthetic judgements and rejects Burke’s contention that beauty is derived solely 
from sensations that depend merely on our physiological constitution. When we 
judge something to be agreeable, Kant says, we can accept that others disagree: ‘this 
dish is agreeable to me’ is an acceptable expression (CJ, §7, 5: 212). But when I 
judge something as beautiful, I cannot claim that it is merely beautiful to me (ibid.): 
27 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 174.
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although our judgement is based on a personal feeling of pleasure (Wohlgefallen), we 
require or demand others to agree with us: a judgement on the beauty of an object is 
always pluralistic.
In some ways, Kant’s view is more similar to Burke’s than to other empiricist 
views such as Hume’s, for Burke holds that the principles of taste are uniform, 
whereas Hume’s famous essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ emphasises the great vari-
ety between people’s judgements of taste and argues that the only real standard of 
taste to be found has to be based on an historical canon and the joint verdict of an 
elite of trained critics, which is the most reliable standard we can possibly have.28 
Burke, however, urges that: ‘as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and 
consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole 
ground-work of Taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation 
for a conclusive reasoning on these matters’ (PE, 24). Unfortunately, he does not 
substantiate this rather bold claim.
Although Kant concurs with Burke’s (typically empiricist) emphasis on the role 
of the senses in matters of taste and stresses the importance of a personal encounter 
with the aesthetic object, he reprehends his conclusion that our common physiology 
sufficiently grounds the universality claim of pure judgements of beauty. Kant 
attempts to provide a priori foundations for what Burke thought were matters of 
natural principles, imagination, custom and physiological disposition. Contra Burke, 
who holds that ‘beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies, acting 
mechanically upon the human mind, by the intervention of the senses’ (PE, III.
xii.112), Kant argues that even when, ‘as experience teaches’, a judgement of beauty 
is ‘often enough rejected’ by others, we should not be deterred from demanding that 
others assent to it (CJ, §7, 5: 213; §8, 5: 214).
However, Burke would never deny what Kant is claiming here, namely that the 
validity of a judgement of taste dep nds on the circumstances in which it is made: 
we can often be mistaken that our own judgement of taste is not based on any per-
sonal interest (CJ, §8, 5: 216; §19, 5: 237), and we can only claim that others will 
judge the object in the same way, if the circumstances are ideal. Yet Kant goes one 
(big) step further than Burke (and other empiricists), when he claims that a judgement 
of beauty is not merely ‘an empirical judgment that I perceive and judge an object 
is beautiful’, but we also claim our judgement to be valid for everyone, and make a 
claim ‘to everyone’s assent, as if it were an objective judgment’ (CJ, §32, 2: 281). Thus, 
‘That I am perceiving and judging an object with pleasure is an empirical judgement. 
But that I find the object beautiful, i.e., that I am entitled to require that liking from 
everyone as necessary, is an a priori judgment’ (CJ, §37, 5: 289). Here Kant clearly 
breaks with Burke, as he maintains that judgements of beauty are a priori rather 
than merely empirical.
When we are judging something as beautiful, it is as if we speak with a ‘universal 
voice’, Kant says (CJ, §8, 5: 216). This universal voice is however not empirical, but 
28 See the end of the introductory essay above (Chap. 1) and Dario Perinetti’s contribution (Chap. 
14) below.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
‘only an Idea’ in the Kantian sense of the term, i.e., a transcendental Idea to which 
no empirical representation conforms. This is especially clear in paragraph 8 of the 
CJ, where Kant states that:
The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone’s agreement (since only a logically 
universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely requires this 
agreement from everyone, as an instance of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects 
confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others. Hence the universal voice 
is only an idea. (…) Whether someone who believes he is making a judgment of taste is in 
fact judging in conformity with that idea may be uncertain; but by using the term beauty he 
indicates that he is at least referring his judging to that idea, and hence that he intends it to 
be a judgment of taste. For himself, however, he can attain certainty on this point, by merely 
being conscious that he is separating whatever belongs to the agreeable and the good from 
the liking that remains to him after that. It is only for this that he counts on everyone’s 
assent, and he would also be justified in making this claim under these conditions, if only 
he were not often to offend against these conditions and thereby make an erroneous judg-
ment of taste. (CJ, §8, 5: 216)
An imputation of general assent in pleasure is ‘only’ a transcendental idea, in the 
Kantian sense of the term, viz. a concept of objective but indeterminate validity. 
Against any rationalist view, Kant insists that the required universal agreement in 
aesthetic judgements is always uncertain. One can reasonably claim that everyone 
should give his approval, but this claim is not based on (confused) concepts, as 
rationalist philosophers argue to hold open the possibility for an ideal agreement.29 
The evidence for (or against) my making a pure judgement of taste is uncertain, and 
it is not necessarily defeated by disagreement either, because I might have been 
wrong about the source of my own pleasure or because another may have not 
obtained the requisite abstraction. It is founded on the idea of the harmony of the 
higher cognitive powers – which is what Kant argues in §9.
This is an important point: the claim to universal validity can neither be falsified 
inductively, but nor – and here again Kant disagrees with Burke – can it be verified 
empirically by basing one’s own judgement on the occurrence of (a consensus of) 
other judgements of taste. Kant thus concurs with Burke’s claim that judgements of 
beauty cannot be based on the subsumption of an object under a determinate con-
cept (such as perfection, as the rationalists hold). Therefore, if Kant is right that 
there is a claim to universal validity in pure judgements of taste, the universality that 
is at stake is subjective or aesthetic: ‘for this quantity’, Kant writes in Sect. 8, ‘I use 
the expression general validity [Allgemeingültigkeit], by which I mean the validity 
that a presentation’s reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [may] have 
for every subject, rather than the validity of a presentation’s reference to the cogni-
tive power. (We may, alternatively, use the same expression, universal validity, for 
both the aesthetic and the logical quantity of a judgment, provided we add objective 
29 This does not rule out the possibility that the content of aesthetic judgements involves concepts. 
What Kant claims is merely that concepts cannot form a basis for rationally imputing our aesthetic 
appraisal to others. Aesthetic judgements are independent of the subsumption of the object under 
concepts – no more, no less.
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for the logical universal validity to distinguish it from the merely subjective one, 
which is always aesthetic.)’ (CJ, §8, 5: 214–215). The subjective universality of 
judgements of taste has to do neither with any moral interest, nor with the content 
of the judgement but clearly with the epistemic status of the judgement30: its exten-
sion is not (as in a logical judgement) a class of objects but ‘a class of possible 
human judges’.31 This universal validity cannot be based on the classification of the 
object under a concept: the step from ‘This rose is beautiful’ to ‘All roses are beautiful’ 
is not guaranteed by the universal validity of the first judgement. One could say that 
singularity and universality are tied together in a pure judgement of taste: in and 
through a singular judgement, that is in confrontation with a particular object, the 
universal shareability of the feeling of pleasure is immediately claimed, without any 
reference to determinate concepts.
The problem of founding the aesthetic judgement’s universal validity claim can 
only be tackled by introducing an important term that Kant uses for the first time in 
the notorious §9 (on the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of 
pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the judging precedes the pleasure), 
viz. universal communicability (allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit). This is what needs to 
be accounted for if we want to find the justification for the universality claim in the 
judgement of taste. Unfortunately, Kant has written one of the most confusing pas-
sages on this very issue. He states:
If the pleasure in the given object came first, and our judgment of taste were to attribute only 
the pleasure’s universal communicability to the presentation of the object, then this proce-
dure would be self-contradictory. For that kind of pl asure would be none other than mere 
agreeableness in the sensation, so that by its very nature it could have only private validity, 
because it would depend directly on the presentation by which the object is given. Hence it 
must be the capacity for being universally communicated of the mental state [allgemeine 
Mittheilungsfähigkeit des Gemüthszustandes], in the given representation, which underlies 
the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its 
consequence. (CJ, §9, 5: 217)
Kant makes two rather puzzling statements. First, the pleasure is said to be the 
result of the aesthetic judgement; but how is this possible if the pleasure is also sup-
posed to be the judgement’s condition or ground? Secondly, aesthetic pleasure is 
argued to be the consequence of the universal communicability of the mental state 
in the judgement. How can the pleasure of taste be the consequence of the universal 
communicability of the mental state, when the latter is supposed to be pleasurable 
itself (at least in positive judgements of taste)? This looks circular.32 We can deal 
with the first problem fairly easily by making an essential distinction between the 
act of judging or contemplating the object (Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes) and the 
30 Although the aesthetic judgement is not cognitive, the subject’s cognitive capacities (viz. under-
standing and imagination) are clearly involved.
31 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 132.
32 See also D. Crawford, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 
70, and Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, 111ff., on which the following is partly based.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
judgement of taste (Geschmacksurtheil) as such. Judging the object obviously 
precedes the pleasure, but the latter precedes the actual judgement of taste. It not 
only precedes it, it also forms the determining ground of the judgement of taste 
proper. According to Guyer, §9 contains the basic elements for a theory of aesthetic 
appraisal that consists of two logically – but not necessarily phenomenologically – 
distinct acts of reflection. First, an act of mere reflection in which pleasure is felt, 
and secondly, an act of aesthetic judgement proper, in which the cause of the plea-
sure is attributed to the harmonious play of the faculties. On this reading too, however, 
Kant’s apparent implication that the universal communicability of the mental state 
in judging the object is itself the source of the sensed pleasure is, as Guyer puts it, 
‘obviously absurd’,33 since it suggests that universal communicability is constitutive 
of aesthetic pleasure instead of merely playing a part in evaluating it.34
Yet in the same section Kant explicitly denies that pleasure in the ability to com-
municate one’s mental state could account for the aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful. 
There is, Kant says, pleasure in the ability to communicate, but one cannot appeal 
to it to explain the transcendental necessity connected with the pure judgement of 
taste, since this is merely an empirical or natural propensity (Hang) to sociability 
(CJ, §9, 5: 218). This is clearly a reference to Burke’s view of beauty as ‘a social 
quality’, belonging to the social passions that are comparable to ‘good company, 
lively conversations, and the endearments of friendship’, and because of their social 
nature all ‘fill the mind with great pleasure’ (PE, I.xi.43) But what is exactly Kant’s 
idea here? Perhaps the only way to explain Kant’s remarkable implication that 
aesthetic pleasure is grounded in the universal communicability itself would be 
to qualify the aesthetic judgement, as Hannah Ginsborg does, as ‘a formal and 
self-referential judgment that claims, not the universal validity of an antecedently 
given feeling of pleasure, but rather its own universal validity with respect to the 
object’.35 Thus, a judgement of taste would be a judegment about the normativity of 
one’s own mental state (Gemütszustand). The demand for assent is merely the 
demand that others recognise this normativity, i.e., that I judge the object as it ought 
be judged, namely as beautiful. However, one might wonder how self-referential 
judgements could avoid making use of concepts, and hence, whether Ginsborg’s 
account does not illegitimately turn aesthetic judgements into intellectual judgements, 
33 P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 137.
34 See ibid. As Guyer contends, this would imply that in a solipsistic situation no one could take 
pleasure in a beautiful object. Only if there were the possibility of communication, would aesthetic 
pleasure be possible. This was actually Kant’s anthropological view before he wrote the Critique 
of Judgment. See Logik Blomberg, 24: 45–46: ‘taste can therefore impossibly be separately solitary 
[abgesondert eigenthümlich]’; Logik Philippi, 24: 353–5; Anthropologie Collins 15: 179–80. This 
also occurs, however, in texts written after the Critique of Judgment, as in, for instance, his 
Anthropology for a Pragmatic Point of View 7: 244 and the Metaphysics of Morals 6: 212. See also 
Metaphysik L1 28: 249–51, where he argues that the universal sense (allgemeine Sinn) underlying 
judgements of taste has to be identified with a communal sense (gemeinschaftliche Sinn), and also 
emphasises that ‘whoever does not come into a community has no communal sense’ (28: 249).
35 H. Ginsborg, “Reflective Judgment and Taste,” Noûs 24, no. 1 (1990): 70.
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i.e., judgments of cognition requiring concepts to determine the correctness of 
ascribing one’s mental state to others, or – at least – into what Kant calls in his Logik 
Dohna-Wundlacken ‘beautiful cognition’ (schönes Erkenntnis), which is no longer 
based on the free play of the cognitive faculties, and hence is altogether different 
form a pure judgement of taste.36 Secondly, it is hard to see how Ginsborg’s view 
could allow for negative judgements of taste: if Kant meant the judgement of taste 
to be self-referential, i.e., referring to the normativity or appropriateness of my 
mental state with regard to the object deemed beautiful, and if the pleasure of taste 
is really in the universal communicability of my pleasure, then there is no room for 
a universally communicable displeasure, since universal communicability is itself a 
source of pleasure.37
I do not believe Ginsborg’s view is what Kant had in mind. It is hard to see how 
one can account for the intricacies of Kant’s theory of aesthetic response without 
logically distinguishing between two acts of reflection. On the other hand, it is 
equally difficult how Guyer’s logical distinction can be translated into more phe-
nomenological or ‘psychological’ terms. Although it forms no legitimate basis for 
the universal validity or communicability of the judgement of taste proper, the disin-
terestedness is actually the affective ‘symptom’ of the fact that the pleasure 
(or displeasure) must be attributed to the reciprocal quickening of the mental faculties 
that are operative in aesthetic judgements of taste – the ‘feeling of life’38 of the subject – 
and not to some idiosyncratic inclination or quirk: displeasure signals the dishar-
mony, whereas pleasure signals the harmony of the two cognitive powers involved 
in aesthetic judging. It is in this sense Kant’s stat ment, quoted above, can be readily 
understood: ‘it must be the capacity for being universally communicated of the 
mental state [allgemeine Mittheilungsfähigkeit des Gemüthszustandes], in the given 
representation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, 
and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence’ (italics added).
Instead of qualifying this idea as hopelessly absurd, as Paul Guyer does, or (like 
Hannah Ginsborg) defining aesthetic judgements as self-referential which deprives 
them of their disinterested nature – since pleasure in the universal communicability 
of the mental state cannot be disinterested but is (as Kant holds) a natural inclination, 
one might interpret Kant’s claim in §9 – no matter how clumsy Kant’s formulation 
is – as follows. Phenomenologically speaking, the purity of taste – the disinterestedness 
of the experienced pleasure – is subjectively determined (as its subjective condition, 
36 See Logik Dohna-Wundlacken, 24: 710: ‘Wenn Anschauung und Begriff zusammenstimmen zur 
Belebung der Erkenntnis selbst, so machen sie in uns ein Wohlgefallen und dann nennt man es 
schönes Erkenntnis. Man muss sich bemühen, dass Verstand und Einbildungskraft zu einem 
Geschaft zusammenstimmen. Dies ist aber nicht mehr Spiel’ (italics added).
37 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, 115.
38 For an interesting treatment of the parallels and differences between beauty’s ‘feeling of life’ 
(Lebensgefühl) and morality’s ‘feeling of spirit’ (Geistesgefühl), which is not a feeling of sense – 
although it is in some way palpable, see John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 292–305. Interestingly, Kant also 
uses the term Geistesgefühl and not Lebensgefühl in connection with the feeling of the sublime.
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9 Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience
Kant says) by the necessity of being universally communicable or shareable, i.e., by 
the ‘signal’ in the mind (Gemüth) that the felt pleasure (or displeasure) is univer-
sally communicable. This implies that, on the one hand, the disinterestedness of the 
pleasure is the essential, a priori condition for the universal communicability of 
aesthetic judgements – without disinterestedness aesthetic judgements could not be 
universally shared, for disinterestedness, or so Kant argues, implies the purposeful 
‘play’ of the cognitive powers.39 But, on the other hand, the capacity for universal 
communicability is itself the ideal gauge to estimate whether the experienced plea-
sure is really disinterested or not. Hence, Kant writes: ‘the pleasure in the object 
must be its consequence’. Only through its possibility of universal communication 
can it be estimated, Kant holds, whether or not the felt pleasure is actually disinter-
ested or not. So in this sense, and in this sense only, can the pleasure in an object be 
the consequence of ‘the capacity for being universally communicated of the mental 
state [allgemeine Mittheilungsfähigkeit des Gemüthszustandes]’. Whether or not the 
pleasure is really pure pleasure, i.e., the disinterested pleasure that grounds a pure 
judgement of taste, depends on the very universal communicability of the aesthetic 
judgement, which is the ratio cognoscendi of the disinterestedness of the pleasure.40 
That one can actually be fairly certain (though one will never be able to prove it by 
means of arguments) that the pleasure one experiences here and now is disinterested 
is grounded in – though not caused by – the universal communicability of the mental 
state – or more precisely still, in the affect that ‘signals’ whether or not the activity of 
the mental powers is universally communicable. And this affect, or rather this uni-
versally communicable mental state, of course, presupposes ‘a capacity for being 
universally communicated’.
Conclusion
A number of different traits run through Kant’s responses to the Burkean form of 
physiological and empiricist analysis of aesthetic pleasure that he diagnoses. One 
key feature of his approach is to argue that the empiricist method cannot account for 
the qualitative difference between the agreeable and the beautiful, since it does not 
acknowledge his controversial criterion of the disinterestedness of the pleasure on 
which a judgement of beauty is based. Another characteristic of his approach is 
essentially to argue that Burke’s empirical psycho-physiological analysis of beauty 
should ultimately be refuted, since it cannot account for the aesthetic judgement’s 
claim to universal assent, and hence fails to adequately describe the extremely 
significant ‘pluralistic’ or social nature of the feeling and judgement of beauty.
39 In the anthropology lectures as early as 1781, he still held that aesthetic pleasures are ‘public’, 
generally shared pleasures. Before the CJ, he denied that they ground universality and necessity 
claims.
40 For a more extended discussion of this, see B. Vandenabeele, “The Subjective Universality of 
Aesthetic Judgements Revisited,” British Journal of Aesthetics 48, no. 4 (2008): 410–425.
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These few reflections are hardly meant to constitute an adequate assessment of 
Burke’s aesthetics of the beautiful. My purposes in this essay have only been to 
show that Kant is profoundly concerned with Burke’s empiricism, and that recogn-
ising that his transcendental critique of the judgement of beauty is, to a certain 
extent, structured around the task of responding to this Burkean form of empiricism 
may be a useful way to illuminate the significance of both their contributions to 
philosophical aesthetics.
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